Fred B. Schneider and Greg Morrisett and Robert Harper: A Language-Based Approach to Security
Informatics—10 Years Back, 10 Years Ahead, LNCS 2000

**Goal:** Leverage program rewriting and program analysis to enforce security policies
Enduring Design Principles

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Violation of principles provides excellent conditions for viruses: scripts hidden in emails run with all the privileges of the user that receives the message.
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Principles can no longer be ensured by operating systems, but can be supported by Language-based security
Reference Monitors

Examples

- access control
- traps for system calls

Trade-off between effectiveness and protection from subversion

- Reference monitors can always be simulated by software
- But an analyzer operating on program text more powerful than operating on single execution only.
Security Policies

Implementable by reference monitor?

- Yes: Access control
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Requirements:
- acceptable sequences prefix closed
- non-acceptable sequences rejected after finite number of steps
- sufficient to examine one sequence (i.e., a property)

Whether information flows from $x$ to $y$: is not a property:

```
public := 1; if secret = 7 then public := 0
```

Sequence ($public := 1$) seems benign, but is not!
Language based approaches

- Program Rewriting (inlined execution monitors)
- Program Analysis
- Certifying Compilation
Inlined Execution Monitors

Rewrite incoming code by inserting checks (must ensure that target program cannot bypass these)

One most define

- security events
- security state
- security updates

Method is compositional.

For sensible inlining, some structure and/or annotation must be present
Type Systems

Shifts burden of proof from recipient to consumer

Well-typed programs do not go wrong
for instance, cannot apply wrong operations to wrong values

Run-time checks still needed for array bounds etc., in the absence
of stronger systems (like dependent types)
Certifying Compilers

Compiler produces object code equipped with proof
Certificate checker part of trusted base, compiler not!
Types as proofs (until recently, type systems for high-level languages only):

- JVM code (but policy supported very weak)
- TAL (Typed Assembly Language)

Most aggressive and general: PCC (Proof Carrying Code)
Synergy among approaches

Adding IRM, checking for say array bounds, to

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- **type systems** These can check complex properties like information flow, but it is cumbersome to check for array bounds

- **certifying compilers** These can also check complex properties, but it may be burdensome to prove at compile time that an index gets never out of bound.
More synergy

IRM + certifying compilers

- rewriting should be followed by optimizations.
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IRM + certifying compilers

- rewriting should be followed by optimizations.
- would not like optimization routines to be part of trusted base.
- Insert proofs that removed checks are not needed!