

Language-Based Information-Flow Security

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A scenario: free service software

Users freely download and use the software providing a service:

- Grokster, Kazaa,
 Morpheus,... are file sharing services helping
 users exchange files
- Come with "hooks" for automatic updates
- Support advertisement to justify cost







Real story: malware

Users are tricked to download software bundled with:

- Homepage/search hijackers (MySearch)
- Unsolicited pop-up ads
- Rewriting URLs to override original ads with own
- "Hooks" for automatic updates are used to execute the advertiser's arbitrary code (MediaUpdate, DownLoadware)
- Information gathering—visited URLs and filled forms are forwarded to a third-party (Gator, IPInsight, Transponder)









General problem: malicious and/or buggy code is a threat

- Trends in software
 - mobile code, executable content
 - platform-independence
 - extensibility
- These trends are attackers' opportunities!
 - easy to distribute worms, viruses, exploits,...
 - write (an attack) once, run everywhere
 - systems are vulnerable to undesirable modifications
- Need to keep the trends without compromising information security

Language-based security

- Looking under the street light...
 Attacker model:
 - eavesdropping on network
 - modifying network traffic
 - trusted communication endpoints
- ⇒ cryptographic protection of communication
- ...for a key that lies somewhere else!
 Real story [CERT]: Most attacks are
 - remote penetrations (buffer overruns, format strings, RPC vulnerabilities,...)
 - malware (viruses, worms, DDoS slaves,...)
- ⇒ need protection at application level

Information security: confidentiality

- Confidentiality: sensitive information must not be leaked by computation (non-example: spyware attacks)
- End-to-end confidentiality: there is no insecure information flow through the system
- Standard security mechanisms provide no end-to-end guarantees
 - Security policies too low-level (legacy of OS-based security mechanisms)
 - Programs treated as black boxes

Confidentiality: standard security mechanisms

Access control

- +prevents "unauthorized" release of information
- but what process should be authorized?

Firewalls

- +permit selected communication
- permitted communication might be harmful

Encryption

- +secures a communication channel
- even if properly used, endpoints of communication may leak data

Confidentiality: standard security mechanisms

Antivirus scanning

- +rejects a "black list" of known attacks
- but doesn't prevent new attacks

Digital signatures

- +help identify code producer
- -no security policy or security proof guaranteedSandboxing/OS-based monitoring
- +good for low-level events (such as read a file)
- -programs treated as black boxes
- ⇒ Useful building blocks but no end-to-end security guarantee

Confidentiality: languagebased approach

- Counter application-level attacks at the level of a programming language—look inside the black box! Immediate benefits:
- Semantics-based security specification
 - End-to-end security policies
 - Powerful techniques for reasoning about semantics
- Static security analysis
 - Analysis enforcing end-to-end security
 - Track information flow via security types
 - Type checking by the compiler removes run-time overhead



Dynamic security enforcement

Java's sandbox, OS-based monitoring, and Mandatory Access Control dynamically enforce security policies; But:

Problem: monitoring a single execution path is not enough!

Static certification

- Only run programs which can be statically verified as secure before running them
- Static certification for inclusion in a compiler [Denning & Denning'77]
- More precise implicit flow analysis
- Enforcement by static analysis (e.g., security-type systems)

A security-type system

Expressions:

exp: high

h ∉ Vars(exp) exp: low

Atomic commands (pc represents context):

$$[pc] \vdash h := exp$$

A security-type system: Compositional rules

$$\frac{[\mathsf{high}] \vdash \mathsf{C}}{[\mathsf{low}] \vdash \mathsf{C}}$$

$$[pc] \vdash C_1 \quad [pc] \vdash C_2$$
$$[pc] \vdash C_1; C_2$$

implicit
flows:
branches
of a high
if must be
typable in
a high
context

```
exp:pc [pc] \vdash C_1 [pc] \vdash C_2

[pc] \vdash if exp then C_1 else C_2
```

A security-type system: Examples

$$[low] \vdash h:=l+4; l:=l-5$$

[pc] \vdash if h then h:=h+7 else skip

[low] \vdash while l < 34 do l := l+1

[pc] $\not\vdash$ while h<4 do |:=|+1|


Semantics-based security

- What end-to-end policy such a type system guarantees (if any)?
- Semantics-based specification of information-flow security [Cohen'77], generally known as noninterference [Goguen & Meseguer'82]:

A program is secure iff high inputs do not interfere with low-level view of the system

Semantics-based security

 Noninterference [Goguen & Meseguer]: as high input varied, low-level outputs unchanged



Semantics-based security for C:

 \forall mem,mem'. mem = \text{lmem'} \infty \text{[C]mem} \approx \text{[C]mem'}

Low-memory equality: $(h,l) =_l (h',l')$ iff l=l' C's behavior: semantics [C]

Low view \approx_L : indistinguishability by attacker

Semantics-based security

- What is \approx_{I} for our language?
- Intention: [pc] ⊢ C ⇒ C is secure
 I.e., if C is typable then

```
\forall s_{1}, s_{2}. \ s_{1} =_{L} s_{2}
\Rightarrow [\![ C ]\!] s_{1} \approx_{L} [\![ C ]\!] s_{2}
\Leftrightarrow [\![ C ]\!] s_{1} \neq \bot \neq [\![ C ]\!] s_{2} \Rightarrow [\![ C ]\!] s_{1} =_{L} [\![ C ]\!] s_{2}
```

Termination-insensitive interpretation of $pprox_{\mathsf{L}}$

Evolution of language-based information flow

Before mid nineties two separate lines of work:

Static certification, e.g., [Denning & Denning'76, Bergeretti & Carré'85, Mizuno & Oldehoeft'87, Palsberg & Ørbæk'95]


Security specification, e.g., [Cohen'77, Andrews & Reitman'80, Banâtre & Bryce'93, McLean'94]


Volpano et al.'96: First connection between noninterference and static certification: security-type system that enforces noninterference

Evolution of language-based information flow

Four main categories of current information-flow security research:

- Enriching language expressiveness
- Exploring impact of concurrency
- Analyzing covert channels (mechanisms not intended for information transfer)
- Refining security policies





Concurrency: Nondeterminism

- Possibilistic security: variation of h should not affect the set of possible l
- An elegant equational security characterization [Leino & Joshi'00]: suppose HH ("havoc on h") sets h to an arbitrary value; C is secure iff

 $\forall s. \llbracket HH; C; HH \rrbracket s \approx \llbracket C; HH \rrbracket s$

Concurrency: Multi-threading

- The high data must be protected at all times: h:=0; l:=h is secure as a sequential program, but not when h:=h' is run in parallel
- A type system [Smith & Volpano'98] for nondeterministically scheduled threads rejects high while loops, but not leaks via schedulers:

```
if h then sleep(100);
l:=1
```



sleep(50); !:=0

Encoding of a timing leak to a direct leak

Concurrency: Multi-threading

- A later work [Volpano & Smith'98] proposes a "protect" command for wrapping high ifs
- Scheduler-independent security; no need for "protect" via Agat's transformation [Sabelfeld & Sands'00]
- Thread synchronization (as by semaphores) may lead to leaks by blocking [Sabelfeld'01]
- Permissive type systems for multithreaded programs [Boudol & Castellani'01,'02]
- A uniform type system [Honda et al.'00,'02] and a light type system [Pottier'02] for noninterference in $\pi-$ calculus
- Security through low determinism [Zdancewic & Myers'03]

Confidentiality issues for distributed systems


concur- • Blocking of a process observable by other processes (also timing, probabilities,...)

distribution

- Messages travel over publicly observable medium; encryption protects messages' contents but not their presence
- Mutual distrust of components
- Components (hosts) may be compromised/ subverted; messages may be delayed/lost

Concurrency: Distribution

- Jif/split: An architecture for secure program splitting to run on heterogeneously trusted hosts [Zdancewic et al.'01]
- Type systems for secrecy for cryptographic protocols in spi-calculus [Abadi'97, Abadi & Blanchet'01]
- Logical relations for the low view [Sumii & Pierce'01]
- Interplay between communication primitives and types of channels [Sabelfeld & Mantel'02]
- Secure replication and partitioning [Zheng et al.'03]



Covert channels: Termination

 Covert channels are mechanisms not intended for information transfer

Is while h>0 do h:=h+1 secure?

• Low view \approx_L must match observational power (if the attacker observes (non)termination):

$$s \approx_L s' \text{ iff } s = \bot = s' \lor (s \neq \bot \neq s' \land s =_L s')$$

PER model can be naturally lifted to handle termination

Covert channels: Timing

- Nontermination \approx_{L} time-consuming computation
- Bisimulation-based \approx_{L} accurately expresses the observational power [Sabelfeld & Sands'00, Smith'01,'03]
- Agat's cross-copying technique for transforming out timing leaks [Agat'00]

Covert channels: Probabilistic


Possibilistically but not probabilistically secure:

```
if h then sleep(100);
l:=1
```



sleep(50); l:=0

- Probability-sensitive \approx_{L} by PERs [Sabelfeld & Sands'99]
- Probabilistic bisimulation-based security [Volpano & Smith'99,Sabelfeld & Sands'00, Smith'01,'03]



Security policies

- Many programs intentionally release information, or perform declassification
- Noninterference is restrictive for declassification
 - Encryption
 - Password checking
 - Spreadsheet computation (e.g., tax preparation)
 - Database query (e.g., average salary)
 - Information purchase
- Most approaches to information flow control ignore declassification—need more flexible security policies

Security policies: Declassification

 To legitimize declassification we could add to the type system:

declassify(h): low

- But this violates noninterference
- What's the right typing rule? What's the security condition that allows intended declassifications?

Security policies

- Secrecy in protocols [Abadi'97]
- Relative secrecy [Volpano&Smith'00, Volpano'00]
- Quantitative security [Denning'82,Clark et al.'02,Lowe'02]
- Approximate security $(\approx_L)_{\epsilon}$ [Di Pierro et al.'02]
- Complexity-theoretic security [Laud'01,'03]
- Admissibility [Dam & Giambiagi'00, Giambiagi & Dam'03]
- Decentralized security model [Myers&Liskov'97]
- Robust declassification [Zdancewic&Myers'01, Zdancewic'03]
- Access control policies for secure information flow [Banerjee & Naumann'03]
- Cryptographic types [Duggan'02]
- Type-based distributed access control [Chothia et al.'03]

Language-based information security: challenges

Some essential challenges—some are not addressed by current trends!

- System-wide security
- Certifying compilation
- Attacks beyond abstraction
- Dynamic policies
- - ⇒ Opportunities for integrating model checking, logic, theorem proving, code rewriting,...

Conclusion

- Security practices not capable of tracking information flow
- Language-based security: effective information flow security models (semantics-based security) and enforcement mechanisms (securitytype systems)
- Progress on expressive languages, concurrency, covert channels, security policies
- Critical challenges remain for language-based mechanisms to become a part of security practice

End of talk

