# A Sound Type System for Secure Flow Analysis 

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# Secure Information Flow Analysis 

- Static analysis is used to ensure sensitive information is not leaked
- Define a lattice of security levels and prove information only flows upwards
e.g. if $L \leq H$ then $L \leadsto L, H \leadsto H, L \leadsto H, H \nsim L$


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Definition (Noninterference) Program $c$ satisifies noninterference if, for any memories $\mu$ and $v$ that agree on $L$ variables, the memories produced by running $c$ on $\mu$ and on $v$ also agree on $L$ variables (provided both runs terminate successfully)

## Type-Based Approach

- Security levels $\approx$ Types
- Lattice order on security levels $\approx$ Subtyping
- Program certification $\approx$ Type checking


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welltyped $(P) \Rightarrow$ noninterference( $P$ )


## The Core Language

Phrases $p::=e \mid c$
Expressions $\quad e \quad::=\begin{aligned} & x|l| n\left|e+e^{\prime}\right| e-e^{\prime} \mid \\ & e=e^{\prime} \mid e<e^{\prime}\end{aligned}$
Commands $\quad c \quad::=\begin{aligned} & e:=e^{\prime}\left|c ; c^{\prime}\right| \text { if } e \text { then } c \text { else } c^{\prime} \mid \\ & \text { while } e \text { do } c \mid \text { letvar } x:=e \text { in } c\end{aligned}$

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Security classes $s \in S C$ (partially ordered by $\leq$ )

$$
\text { Type } \tau::=s
$$

Phrase types $\quad \rho::=\tau|\tau \operatorname{var}| \tau \mathrm{cmd}$

## Typing Judgements

$$
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- $\lambda: l \rightarrow \tau$ location typing
- $\gamma: x \rightarrow \rho$ identifier typing


## Typing Rules

| (INT) | $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash n: \tau$ |
| ---: | :--- |
| (VAR) | $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash x: \tau$ var $\quad$ if $\gamma(x)=\tau$ var |
| (VARLOC) | $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash l: \tau$ var $\quad$ if $\lambda(l)=\tau$ |
|  | $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash e: \tau$, |
| (ARITH) | $\frac{\lambda ; \gamma \vdash e^{\prime}: \tau}{\lambda ; \gamma \vdash e+e^{\prime}: \tau}$ |
|  | $\frac{\lambda ; \gamma \vdash e: \tau \text { var }}{\lambda ; \gamma \vdash e: \tau}$ |
| (R-VAL) |  |
|  | $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash e: \tau$ var, |
| (ASSIGN) | $\frac{\lambda ; \gamma \vdash e^{\prime}: \tau}{\lambda ; \gamma \vdash e:=e^{\prime}: \tau c m d}$ |

## Typing Rules

Upward flow from $e$ to $e^{\prime}$ allowed if $e: H, e^{\prime}: L$, and $e^{\prime}$ can be coerced to $H$, then with the rule applied with $\tau=H$

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \lambda ; \gamma \vdash e: \tau \text { var }, \\
\text { (ASSIGN) } & \frac{\lambda ; \gamma \vdash e^{\prime}: \tau}{\lambda ; \gamma \vdash e:=e^{\prime}: \tau c m d}
\end{array}
$$

## Typing Rules

| (COMPOSE) | $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash c: \tau c m d$, $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash c^{\prime}: \tau c m d$ |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash c ; c^{\prime}: \tau c m d$ |
| (IF) | $\begin{aligned} & \lambda ; \gamma \vdash e: \tau, \\ & \lambda ; \gamma \vdash c: \tau c m d, \\ & \lambda ; \gamma \vdash c^{\prime}: \tau c m d \end{aligned}$ |
| (WHILE) | $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash$ if $e$ then $c$ else $c^{\prime}: \tau c m d$ |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \lambda ; \gamma \vdash e: \tau, \\ & \lambda ; \gamma \vdash c: \tau c m d \end{aligned}$ |
|  | $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash$ while $e$ do $c: \tau$ cmd |
| (LETVAR) | $\begin{aligned} & \lambda ; \gamma \vdash e: \tau \\ & \lambda ; \gamma[x: \tau \text { var }] \vdash c: \tau^{\prime} c m d \end{aligned}$ |
|  | $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash$ letvar $x:=e$ in $c: \tau^{\prime} c m d$ |

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& \lambda ; \gamma \vdash c: \tau c m d, \\
& \lambda ; \gamma \vdash c^{\prime}: \tau c m d \\
& \hline \lambda ; \gamma \vdash \text { if } e \text { then } c \text { else } c^{\prime}: \tau c m d
\end{aligned}
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Suppose $\gamma(x)=\gamma(y)=H$ var and $\tau=H$

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$\gamma \vdash$ if $x=1$ then $y:=1$ else $y:=0$

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Suppose $\gamma(x)=\gamma(y)=H$ var and $\tau=H$
$H \quad H \quad c m d \quad H \mathrm{cmd}$
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Suppose $\gamma(x)=\gamma(y)=H$ var and $\tau=H$

$$
\begin{gathered}
H \quad H \quad c m d \quad H \mathrm{cmd} \\
\gamma \vdash \text { if } x=1 \text { then } y:=1 \text { else } y:=0: H \mathrm{cmd}
\end{gathered}
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Suppose $\gamma(x)=L$ var, $\gamma(y)=H$ var, $\tau=L$, and $L \leq H$ so that $H \mathrm{cmd} \subseteq L \mathrm{cmd}$
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|  | $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash c ; c^{\prime}: \tau c m d$ |
| (IF) | $\begin{aligned} & \lambda ; \gamma \vdash e: \tau, \\ & \lambda ; \gamma \vdash c: \tau c m d, \\ & \lambda ; \gamma \vdash c^{\prime}: \tau c m d \end{aligned}$ |
| (WHILE) | $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash$ if $e$ then $c$ else $c^{\prime}: \tau c m d$ |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \lambda ; \gamma \vdash e: \tau, \\ & \lambda ; \gamma \vdash c: \tau c m d \end{aligned}$ |
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## Subtyping Rules

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text { (BASE) } & \frac{\tau \leq \tau^{\prime}}{\vdash \tau \subseteq \tau^{\prime}} \\
\text { (REFLEX) } & \vdash \rho \subseteq \rho \\
\text { (TRANS) } & \frac{\vdash \rho \subseteq \rho^{\prime}, \vdash \rho^{\prime} \subseteq \rho^{\prime \prime}}{\vdash \rho \subseteq \rho^{\prime \prime}} \\
\left(\mathrm{CMD}^{-}\right) & \frac{\vdash \tau \subseteq \tau^{\prime}}{\vdash \tau^{\prime} c m d \subseteq \tau c m d} \\
& \lambda ; \gamma \vdash p: \rho, \\
\text { (SUBTYPE) } & \frac{\vdash \rho \subseteq \rho^{\prime}}{} \\
& \lambda ; \gamma \vdash p: \rho^{\prime}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Operational Semantics

- Evaluation is performed relative to a memory $\mu: l \rightarrow n$


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$$
\mu \vdash e \Rightarrow n \quad \mu \vdash c \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime}
$$

## Operational Semantics

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\begin{aligned}
\text { (BASE) } & \mu \vdash n \Rightarrow n \\
\text { (CONTENTS) } & \mu \vdash l \Rightarrow \mu(l) \quad \text { if } l \in \operatorname{dom}(\mu) \\
\text { (ADD) } & \frac{\mu \vdash e \Rightarrow n, \quad \mu \vdash e^{\prime} \Rightarrow n^{\prime}}{\mu \vdash e+e^{\prime} \Rightarrow n+n^{\prime}} \\
\text { (UPDATE) } & \frac{\mu \vdash e \Rightarrow n, \quad l \in \operatorname{dom}(\mu)}{\mu \vdash l:=e \Rightarrow \mu[l:=n]} \\
\text { (SEQUENCE) } & \frac{\mu \vdash c \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime}, \quad \mu^{\prime} \vdash c^{\prime} \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime \prime}}{\mu \vdash c ; c^{\prime} \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime \prime}} \\
\text { (BRANCH) } & \frac{\mu \vdash e \Rightarrow 1, \quad \mu \vdash c \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime}}{\mu \vdash \text { if } e \text { then } c \text { else } c^{\prime} \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime}} \\
& \frac{\mu \vdash e \Rightarrow 0, \quad \mu \vdash c^{\prime} \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime}}{\mu \vdash \text { if } e \text { then } c \text { else } c^{\prime} \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime}}
\end{aligned}
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## Operational Semantics

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text { (LOOP) } \quad & \frac{\mu \vdash e \Rightarrow 0}{\mu \vdash \text { while } e \text { do } c \Rightarrow \mu} \\
& \mu \vdash e \Rightarrow 1, \\
& \mu \vdash c \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime}, \\
& \frac{\mu^{\prime} \vdash \text { while } e \text { do } c \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime \prime}}{\mu \vdash \text { while } e \text { do } c \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime \prime}} \\
& \mu \vdash e \Rightarrow n, \\
& l \text { is the first location not in } \operatorname{dom}(\mu), \\
& \frac{\mu[l:=n] \vdash[l / x] c \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime}}{\mu \vdash \operatorname{letvar} x:=e \text { in } c \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime}-l}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Type Soundness

- Altering the initial values of locations of type $\tau$ cannot affect the initial values of any locations of type $\tau^{\prime}$, provided that $\tau \not \leq \tau^{\prime}$


## Simple Security

## Lemma 6.3 If $\lambda \vdash e: \tau$, then for every $l$ in $e, \lambda(l) \vdash \tau$

- Secrecy

Only locations at level $\tau$ or lower will have their contents read when $e$ is evaluated (no read up)

- Confinement

If $e$ has integrity level $\tau$, then every location in $e$ stores information at integrity level $\tau$

## Confinement

Lemma 6.4 If $\lambda ; \gamma \vdash c: \tau c m d$, then for every $l$ assigned to in $c, \lambda(l) \geq \tau$

- Secrecy

No location below level $\tau$ is updated in $c$
(no write down)

- Confinement

Every location assigned to in $c$ can be updated by information at integrity level $\tau$

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(b) $\mu \vdash c \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime}$,
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$c$ is well typed execution one execution two

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(a) $\lambda \vdash c: \rho$,
(b) $\mu \vdash c \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime}$,
(c) $v \vdash c \Rightarrow v^{\prime}$,
c is well typed
(d) $\operatorname{dom}(\mu)=\operatorname{dom}(v)=\operatorname{dom}(\lambda)$, and execution one execution two

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c is well typed
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(e) $\quad v(l)=\mu(l)$ for all $l$ such that $\lambda(l) \leq \tau \quad$ the same low inputs

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(a) $\lambda \vdash c: \rho$,
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(b) $\mu \vdash c \Rightarrow \mu^{\prime}$, execution one
(c) $v \vdash c \Rightarrow v^{\prime}$, execution two
(d) $\operatorname{dom}(\mu)=\operatorname{dom}(v)=\operatorname{dom}(\lambda)$, and
(e) $\quad v(l)=\mu(l)$ for all $l$ such that $\lambda(l) \leq \tau \quad$ the same low inputs

Then $v^{\prime}(l)=\mu^{\prime}(l)$ for all $l$ such that $\lambda(l) \leq \tau \quad$ the same low outputs

