

# CIS 842: Specification and Verification of Reactive Systems

## Lecture Specifications: Sequencing Properties

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## Objectives

- To understand the goals and basic approach to specifying sequencing properties
- To understand the different classes of sequencing properties and the algorithmic techniques that can be used to check them

## Outline

- What is a sequencing specification?
- What kinds of sequencing specifications are commonly used?
  - Safety properties
  - Liveness properties
- In depth on safety properties
  - How to specify them
  - Examples
  - How to check them

## What is a Sequencing Specification?


- We've seen specifications that are about individual program states
  - e.g., assertions, invariants
- Sometimes we want to reason about the relationship between multiple states
  - Must one state always precede another?
  - Does seeing one state preclude the possibility of subsequently seeing another?
- We need to shift our thinking from states to paths in the state space





## Paths (Traces)


Here are both 1.\* and \*.1 successor states (with black indicating both)



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## Paths (Traces)


Do all paths conform to the pattern:  
a 1.\* is followed by a \*.1



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# Paths (Traces)


Some paths obviously match the pattern



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# Paths (Traces)


For others it is more interesting  
can the 1.\* follow a \*.1?  
what if the 1.\* and \*.1 coincide?



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## Paths (Traces)


For still others we can't tell yet  
will we ever see a 1.\*?  
if not, then does the property hold?



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## Paths (Traces)

For still others we can't tell yet  
will we ever see a subsequent \*.1?



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## We need ...

- A language for describing sequencing patterns
  - There are many such languages with different strengths and weaknesses
- An algorithm for exhaustively considering whether all paths match the pattern
  - Currently we've only seen the exhaustive consideration of individual states

## A classic distinction ...

- Safety properties
  - "nothing bad ever happens"
  - are violated by a *finite* path prefix that ends in a bad thing
  - are fundamentally about the *history* of a computation up to a point
- Liveness properties
  - "something good eventually happens"
  - are violated by *infinite* path suffixes on which the good thing never happens
  - are fundamentally about the *future* of a computation from a point onward



## Examples

- A use of a variable must be preceded by a definition
- When a file is opened it must subsequently be closed
- You cannot shift from drive to reverse without passing through neutral
- No pair of adjacent dining philosophers can be eating at the same time
- The program will eventually terminate
- The program is free of deadlock

## Examples

- A use of a variable must be preceded by a definition -- Safety
- When a file is opened it must subsequently be closed -- Liveness
- You cannot shift from drive to reverse without passing through neutral -- Safety
- No pair of adjacent dining philosophers can be eating at the same time -- Safety
- The program will eventually terminate -- Liveness
- The program is free of deadlock -- Safety

## For You To Do

- Think of three more properties
  - Classify them as safety or liveness
  - How many observations are being made in the properties
- Try to think of at least one positive property
  - i.e., saying what the system can do
- ... and one negative property
  - i.e., saying what the system cannot do
- Is an invariant a safety or liveness property?

## Expressing Safety Properties

- Let's simplify things to start with ...
- We can observe the location of a BIR-lite thread, e.g.,

```
thread MAIN() {
  loc open: live {}
  do { ... } goto run;
  loc run: live {}
```
- Name observables as a pair
  - e.g, **MAIN:open**, **MAIN:run**
- Such an observable is true when the named thread enters the named location

## Regular Expressions

- Regular expressions can be used to specify safety properties
  - Symbols are observables – `MAIN:open`
- Basic Operators
  - Concatenation – `e ; e`
  - Disjunction – `e | e`
  - Closure – `e*`
  - Grouping – `(e)`

## Regular Expressions

- Some Useful Derived Operators
  - Option – `e?`
  - Positive closure – `e+`
  - Finite closure – `ek`
  - Any symbol – `.`
  - Symbol sets – `[e, f, ...]`
  - Symbol exclusion – `[- e, f, ...]`

## Example

```
thread MAIN() {
  loc open: live {} do {
    // open
  } goto run;

  loc run: live {} do {
    // run, call close
  } goto close;
  loc close: live {} do {
    // close
  } goto open;
}
```

## A property

- *Opens and closes happen in matching pairs*
- Positive specification  
`(MAIN:open; MAIN:close)*`
- Negative specification (i.e., violation)  
`MAIN:close; .* |`  
`.*; Main:open; Main:open; .* |`  
`.*; Main:close; Main:close; .*`

## Example

```
system TwoDiningPhilosophers {
  boolean fork1;
  boolean fork2;
  thread Philosopher1() {
    loc pickup1: live {} when !fork1
      do { fork1 := true; } goto pickup2;
    loc pickup2: live {} when !fork2
      do { fork2 := true; } goto eating;
    loc eating: live {} do {} goto drop2;
    loc drop2: live {}
      do { fork2 := false; } goto drop1;
    loc drop1: live {}
      do { fork1 := false; } goto pickup1;
  }
  thread Philosopher2() {...}
}
```

## A property

- *Whenever philosopher 1 is eating, philosopher 2 cannot eat, until philosopher 1 drops his first fork*
- Positive specification  
[- P1:eating]\*;  
(P1:eating; [- P2:eating]\*; P1:drop1)\*
- Negative specification (i.e., violation)  
.\*; P1:eating; [- P1:drop1]; P2.eating; .\*

## For You To Do

- Make up an alphabet and specify the following properties as regular expressions
  - *A use of a variable must be preceded by a definition*
  - *You cannot shift from drive to reverse without passing through neutral*
- Give positive and negative formulations

## Checking Safety Properties

- Think of it as a language problem
  - Program generates a language of strings over observables (each path generates a string) –  $L(P)$
  - Property generates a (regular) language –  $L(S)$
- Test the languages against each other
  - Language containment –  $L(P) \subseteq L(S)$
  - Non-empty language intersection --  $L(P) \cap \overline{L(S)} \neq \emptyset$
  - Interchangeable due to complementation of finite-state automata

## Checking Safety Properties

- Two basic approaches
  - Both require a deterministic finite-state automaton for the violation of the property
  - Easy to get via complementation and standard RE->DFA algorithms
- **Instrument** the program with property
- Check reachability in the **product** of the program and property

## Instrumentation

- Assertions instrument the program
  - They are inserted at specific points
  - They perform tests of program state
  - They render an immediate verdict that is determined completely locally
- The same approach can be applied for safety properties
  - Instrumentation determines a **partial** verdict
  - Need a mechanism for communicating between different parts of the instrumentation

## Example

```
boolean fork1, fork2;
thread Philosopher1() {
  loc pickup1: live {} when !fork1
    do { fork1 := true; } goto pickup2;
  loc pickup2: live {} when !fork2
    do { fork2 := true; } goto eating;
  loc eating: live {} do {} goto drop2;
  loc drop2: live {}
    do { fork2 := false; } goto drop1;
  loc drop1: live {}
    do { fork1 := false; } goto pickup1;
}
```

Consider the property:

a philosopher must pickup a fork before dropping it  
e.g.,  $[- P1.pickup1]^*; P1.drop1; .^*$

## Example

```
boolean fork1, fork2;
thread Philosopher1() {
  loc pickup1: live {} when !fork1
    do {
      // record that a pickup of 1 happened
      fork1 := true;
    } goto pickup2;
  loc pickup2: live {} when !fork2
    do { fork2 := true; } goto eating;
  loc eating: live {} do {} goto drop2;
  loc drop2: live {}
    do { fork2 := false; } goto drop1;
  loc drop1: live {}
    do {
      // check that a pickup of 1 happened
      fork1 := false;
    } goto pickup1;
}
```



## Example

```
boolean fork1, fork2, sawpickup;
thread Philosopher1() {
  loc pickup1: live {} when !fork1
  do {
    sawpickup := true;
    fork1 := true;
  } goto pickup2;
  loc pickup2: live {} when !fork2
  do { fork2 := true; } goto eating;
  loc eating: live {} do {} goto drop2;
  loc drop2: live {}
  do { fork2 := false; } goto drop1;
  loc drop1: live {}
  do {
    assert(sawpickup);
    fork1 := false;
  } goto pickup1;
}
```

Does this capture the correctness property?

## Instrumentation Approach

- Works well when you only want to check conditions at specific points
- What if you want to exclude some action from a region of program execution?  
[- P1:eating]\*;  
(P1:eating; [- P2:eating]\*; P1:drop1)\*
- Need to use invariants

## Example

```
boolean fork1, fork2, pleating;
thread Philosopher1() {
  loc pickup1: live {} when !fork1
  do { fork1 := true; } goto pickup2;
  loc pickup2: live {} when !fork2
  do { fork2 := true; } goto eating;
  loc eating: live {}
  do {
    pleating := true;
  } goto drop2;
  loc drop2: live {}
  do { fork2 := false; }
  loc drop1: live {}
  do {
    fork1 := false;
    pleating := false;
  } goto pickup1;
}
```

Same instrumentation for Philosopher2

Check invariant:

$p1eating \rightarrow !p2eating$

## Instrumentation Approach

- No change to the checking algorithm!
  - Safety checking has been compiled to assertion checking
  - Additional **property** state variables increase cost
- Instrumenting programs is
  - Laborious – must identify all points that are related to the property (may)
  - Error prone – lack of **Automate it!!** change (false error), lack of instrumentation at a state check (missed error)
  - Property specific – must be done for each property

## For You To Do

- Pick your favorite BIR-lite program
- Develop two safety properties for it
- Instrument the program with those properties
- Check them with Bogor

## Product Reachability

- Next time